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Abstract. The literature devoted to the EU often points out its hybrid side, which is in the 
process of constant transformation. The process is comprehensive, in the economic, 
political, military and safety domain. This complex task is not timed, because it is 
considered a process and not a one-time act. The original idea that social changes have 
evolutive development and need time to become quality changes is not abandoned. 
Although today's EU environment is drastically changed compared to the late fifties of the 
last century, the main reasons for a country to join the EU have remained virtually the 
same. All of these reasons basically refer to the same aspirations of potential candidate 
countries for membership: economic, political, safety, cultural and others. Possession of 
an appropriate macroeconomic model and relatively useful statistical data is a conditio 
sine qua non of a successful analysis of the benefit and the cost of joining the EU. 
Key Words: accession process, EU, accession effects, Cecchini report, empirical models of 
accession. 
INTRODUCTION 
The last wave of enlargement, when in 2004, 2007, and 2013, 13 new countries, 
mostly underdeveloped compared to the old member states, were received in the EU 
brought about institutional, political, and economic consequences which the enlarged EU 
had to face. The accession of these countries to the EU took place between the two 
extremes. One extreme of the accession itself brings gains and long-term progress. At the 
other extreme of the country joining the EU, there can be only harm, and not benefit. 
Both approaches are based on an estimate, which is not based on facts, analysis or 
historical experiences of economic integration. Today, there is a well-developed 
analytical apparatus that can determine with enough precision the benefits and costs that 
a country which wants to have access to certain economic integration can expect. 
However, there are opinions that the models are often a mere „smoke screen” that allows 
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you to prove what you want. Thereby, the used analytic economic policy and overall 
policy warns that measures should be taken to increase the positive and reduce the 
negative effects of accession integration. It is very difficult to quantify the overall effects 
of accession, but most studies argue that, in the long term, the new member states have 
huge benefits. With the expansion of 2004 and 2007, the forecasts emphasized the profit 
of 10 billion Euros, 300,000 new jobs and increased gross domestic product by 0.2 %. 
The effects of costs are one-time and part such that they will act at all times after the 
entry of new members into the Union. The emergence of some of the costs is considered 
economically favorable (for example, reduction of subsidies or closure of non-competitive 
firms), but in the socio-political sense these are undoubtedly short-term cost. Some 
authors believe that the bodies of the Union and the governments of potential new 
members continue to hide the cost and only glorify benefits. In this way, the actual 
impression that a new member will only have after entering is that of benefit, which of 
course is impossible. The practice of highlighting the benefits and suppressing the costs is 
very reminiscent of the „propaganda for happiness”, which are used by the governments 
of communist countries. 
Due to the fact that the Union has stimulated scientific papers in favor of extension 
and discouraged critical works, does not mean much to the conclusion that most of the 
literature considers extension to the EU and new member states good. Regardless of these 
views, it is obvious that the new members have to pay a price for entry into the Union. 
This price, however, is not the same for all; moreover, it can be drastically different from 
country to country. As far as trade is concerned, spectacular changes were not expected 
other than those that occurred after the removal of tariffs and other barriers in the nineties 
of the XX century. The main effects of enlargement on agriculture could be summed up 
in the expected significant growth in productivity of the agro-industrial complex in the 
candidate countries, whereby a large number of workers tended to drop in agricultural 
production. On the other hand, the effects on agriculture in the member states were very 
small due to the small share of this sector in the structure of GDP and employment. 
1. THE MOTIVES OF A COUNTRY TO JOIN THE EU 
One of the main reasons for joining the European integration is, of course, economic. 
Economic cooperation presupposes the elimination of discrimination on the one hand and 
the establishment of harmonized or common policies on the other. Obviously, the 
benefits are comprised of access to a larger single market, which has enabled a number of 
benefits: improving competitiveness, productivity, promotion of scientific and technological 
cooperation, greater mobility of factors of production, the use of economies of scale, 
economic and monetary stability, and the use of EU Structural Funds. In practical terms, 
there is improvement of not only internal properties of the given economy, but also their 
relative position in the „world”market. 
Closely related to economic are political reasons. It is known that the establishment of 
a common political heritage underlined the objective of closer connectivity. After the fall 
of communism in Eastern Europe has weakened the political motivation of the EU in 
terms of contrast and polarization system to Eastern European block. It is still, according 
to some authors, reflected in the preservation of high standards of social amenities and 
cultural specificities of the EU (Michelmann, 2004). 
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For these reasons, the methods of „inputs” and „outputs” should define the ways in 
which a country can access the EU as a sort of exclusive club, and the ways in which it 
could possibly leave this club. Under conditions of „cold war” and the deep division of 
Europe, there were not practical reasons to clearly define the „input „and” output”. 
Namely, instead of the exit there is effective protection of the right of veto. But in a 
situation where a deep and fundamental change in the whole of Europe was performed, 
and global institutions, associations and organizations (UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank, 
NATO, etc.) began redefining its role, it is essential to have a clearly defined „input” and 
„output” option. In such conditions of global change, the input option has become 
interesting for the remaining members of EFTA, as well as for all the countries in Central 
and South-Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the exit option has not been used, except in one 
case, when Greenland left i.e. its special status was regulated. Given that most of the 
EFTA countries have joined the EU (except Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), 
the Western Balkans countries appear to be the most important group of candidate 
countries for full membership in the EU. 
Due to the proximity, economic importance and policy driven by deeper integration, 
the EU has taken on the role of creators of political and economic relations between these 
countries in order to accelerate the process of their (re)integration into the world 
economy. The accession process was also started in 2000 with the signing of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, under whose influence were also developed 
and function economic institutions, policies and performance of the Western Balkans. 
Some authors refer to these countries, which have started the process of systemic socio-
economic transformation or transition, as „the new European democracies”. It should be 
noted that the Association does not necessarily lead to EU membership. According to H. 
P. Ipsen (Ipsen, 1992) joining is a long-term relationship of a state that stands outside the 
Union with the EU, which remains intact in terms of their organs and internal structure. 
So, part or limited membership cannot be achieved by joining. What is most commonly 
achieved by joining is a fuller participation of associated countries in the objectives of the 
Union, so that the relationship goes beyond the framework of conventional international 
trade agreements. This practically means that the EU and associated states become equal 
partners, whose cooperation is institutionalized at a higher level of mutual relations. 
Regarding the establishment and content of relations joining, there are special rules. They 
are associated to the sets in the „middle” position between full membership and the usual 
contractual partnerships. However, it is possible to properly define three conditions for 
joining the EU, which are related to the geographic, political and economic dimensions. 
The existence of these conditions can be partly inferred from the Treaty of Rome, partly 
on the basis of content agreements with certain countries that the EU has made so far. 
Unlike joining, where there are virtually no geographical restrictions, full membership 
is „reserved” for European countries. Even though it was a clear criterion, it seems it is 
not realized to full extent. Greenland, for example, is thousands of miles away from 
Europe and closer to the United States. Malta may geographically belong to Europe and 
Africa, but culturally, historically and politically it is a part of Europe. At least there is 
clarity in Eastern Europe, where some believe Poland, Slovakia, Hungary are the borders 
of Europe, while others believe it is the Urals. А special case is that of Israel, whose 
population comes mainly from Europe, whose economic and political system is consistent 
with West-European, although the country is geographically located in Asia. 
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Economic conditions include, above all, a market economy with a dominant private 
property as a form of property rights, the economy open to the world, a certain degree of 
competitiveness, and even a certain level of social welfare. In the initial stages of the 
expansion of the EU, a number of authors (correctly) pointed out an assumption related to 
the EU enlargement policy. In fact, it is often the prevalent opinion that only the high and 
middle-income countries are eligible candidates for full membership. It is inconceivable that 
a poor country emerges as a serious candidate. Although at first glance this approach can be 
estimated as wrong, it is not for at least two reasons. The first relates to the conditions of 
accession and the other is tied directly to the level of economic development of the 
candidate. For the explanation of the first reason, it should be noted that during this period 
the terms that candidate countries must meet in order to become full members have not yet 
been precisely defined. In terms of ad hoc acceptance and conclusion of Europe Agreements 
(early nineties) and it was not possible to draw any concrete and more accurate conclusions. 
Unlike the Treaty of Accession, „Europe Treaties” or „Europe Agreements” went much 
further in terms of objectives and content covered. They depart from the wishes of the 
contracting parties to full membership in the EU, establish gradually assume the obligations 
of EU treaties by the associated countries (in the provisions on the free market, and mutual 
assistance) and provide technical and financial support of the EU reform process taking place 
in the accession countries. Their name, „Europe Agreements”, was chosen for these reasons. 
Enlargement policy always followed a policy of deepening economic integration. It 
seems that the fall of the Berlin Wall „came” earlier than the deepening „favored”. 
European agreements served to successfully bridge the gap between the EU wishes to 
receive all Eastern European countries under its wing and its actual ability to do so, given 
the demanding phase transformation integration in the monetary, economic, and political 
union. Also, unlike in the countries admitted to full membership, in economically 
underdeveloped countries the possibility of joining the EU in principle was always open (in 
accordance with the Treaty establishing the EEC and the EU). In such cases, any deviation 
from accepted principles of equitable distribution of rights and obligations is possible, in 
order to meet the needs of protection of young industries of the developing countries. 
According to most authors, the essence of the European Agreements is the same. It 
edited the economic, political and financial relations between the contracting parties. 
These relationships have been set up to European agreements from other association 
agreement which differ in purpose. The goal was obviously associated with membership 
in the EU countries. This practically means that the purpose of the agreement was to 
prepare the European associated countries to join the EU, and to allow them to gradually 
assume the obligations deriving from the establishment of the single market. However, it 
should again be emphasized that the European agreements do not automatically lead to 
membership. After the expiry of the transitional period of ten years, they extend no 
further time limit. Entering of the accession countries to the EU implies, therefore, a 
positive assessment of the Union that they managed to complete, in the transition period, 
the economic, legal and political preparations for full membership. In any case, this 
requires separate negotiations for whose commencement no deadline is scheduled. 
The basic elements of the content of the European Agreement are: 
 Trade liberalization without entering the customs union. However, the principle of 
free trade is not included in the so-called sensitive products, which normally 
account for about 50% of exports of associated countries, 
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 In the case of agricultural products of associated countries, the agreement made a 
somewhat easier access to the EU market, 
 Associated countries are obliged to harmonize their legislation with the EU, 
 There is an obligation of the EU Accession countries to provide technical and 
financial assistance to implement reforms, 
 Freedom payments should be achieved within five years, and the free movement 
of capital in the double extended period of time, 
 Industrial Cooperation aims to encourage the modernization and restructuring of 
the industry in the associated countries. Especially since these countries were 
required to create a climate conducive to private investment. 
In contrast to the Agreement on cooperation that just require countries to make 
modifications to certain institutions (and in some cases not even that), the negotiations on 
the membership explicitly seek possession of „desirable traits” to a particular degree. This 
is done for two reasons. First, to ensure the compatibility of economic, political and legal 
systems of the countries acceding to those in the EU. Second, the acceding countries may 
not function properly after joining the EU. The single market, for example, requires a high 
degree of competitiveness of firms and sectors of the economy, and if it were not the case 
with the state of the new EU, there would be difficulties, both in the new associated country 
and the EU as a whole. Earlier EEC and now the EU have always insisted that, for them it 
was not just words on connecting economic, but also political character. Political terms 
should encompass functioning democracy, separation of powers, a multiparty political 
system, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights and the like. 
In addition to meeting some of the general conditions specified on both sides there 
must be a willingness to join the EU. It is important to note that the mentioned conditions 
for the admission and access to the EU are necessary, but not sufficient. In addition to 
meeting the formal requirements by potential candidates for membership or accession, 
the EU bodies, notably the Council and the Commission, estimate other content-items 
and their possible suitability for membership. 
Due to the continuous expansion, what is practically gained is the impression that the 
EU can only go in that direction, but not to be reduced. If the EU is a community that 
promises its members and provides a profit (no matter what it may contain), then under 
certain conditions, it must have (predicted) the exit option as well. It is unlikely that the 
individual states could make use of an exit option for pure exhibitionism or because of 
some small differences, because they would be playing with their great interests. „Put out” 
would actually be an effective opportunity for those countries that believe that some common 
decisions violated their vital interests. It seems that the „exit option” was also a kind of 
safeguard clause for minorities by the majority - and to measure the ultimate protection. 
The nature of the game in terms of „inputs“ and „outputs” of the EU depends on the 
behavior of specific players. Obviously, the Austrian entry into the EU represented a 
strong argument in favor of a future receipt of several other countries, with which Austria 
has strong economic, political and historical ties (such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia). Also, the entry of the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Denmark, and 
Sweden especially) was a strong pressure for the EU enlargement to the Baltic countries 
(Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania). We should not forget that these are small countries that 
are geographically located on the border of Russia, as every economic and political 
arrangement gives strategic importance. On the other hand, the possible withdrawal of 
Germany from the EU would bring into question not only the initiated expansion of the 
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EU to the East, but also the survival of the EU as a whole. On the basis of the above 
examples, it can be concluded that, although the formal rules of the game (in the sense 
that it is equally applicable for each country), the presence or absence of certain states, or 
key players, could represent an important suggestion, both in terms of further development 
of the game, and in terms of external EU preferences. 
In contrast to the seventies of the last century, when the EU in terms of degree of 
integration and the number of member states was much more modest, today (and 
tomorrow) a lot of difficult tasks and obstacles can be put in front of the numerous EU 
newcomers. The conditions and procedure for signing the Association Agreement, 
starting with the European agreement, to the special Stabilization and Association for 
Balkan countries, have so far been repeatedly changed. It is known that the last twelve 
new member states underwent an extremely expensive and almost „traumatic” period of 
adjustment, especially in the economic sphere, that their membership requirements were 
seriously considered. A major problem in the process of joining the EU is the 
circumstance that the fulfillment of each of the set of criteria has economic, social and 
political costs that the countries, at least at that moment, are not able to accept. 
2. HELP ECONOMETRICS IN MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSION 
The first theoretically and empirically based approach to evaluate the economic effects of 
integration, dating back to the 60s of the last century, is a sort of ex - post evaluation. The 
basis of these attempts has been the so-called partial equilibrium models. One of the more 
successful is the Balassa coefficient (1975) which included the effects of market growth 
(increase of productivity, reduction of operating costs, increase of competitiveness, 
economies of scale), and evaluated the effects on GDP growth and investment. Also, it is 
important to mention Smith and Venables’ research (1988) regarding the assessment of the 
effects of the single market. The authors focused on the ten industries, given the scenario 
assessment of future effects of integration (the ex - ante evaluation). However, what most 
authors observed are severe restrictions on access to partial equilibrium. For these reasons, 
this method gave way to models of general equilibrium (Computable General Equilibrium - 
CGE) or macro models. Numerical values in CGE models are based on credible assumptions 
and macro-alone rely on econometrically-estimated equations. Now it was possible to 
examine the interdependence of the various sectors and assess the overall effects and 
redistributive effects on the economy as a whole. In 1992 Gasiorek, for example, developed 
the work of Smith and Venables (1988) and turned it into the general equilibrium model 
calculating the long-term effects of European integration. In later works, the author has 
expanded the circle of countries studied to include Spain and Portugal, in addition to the 
earlier „European Six”, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland and Denmark. 
With respect to the macroeconomic effects, well-known is the Cecchini report (1988) 
compiled for the European institutions, assessing the micro and macro effects of the 
formation of a single market in 1992.  
2.1 Cecchini report 
The focus of the Milan summit (in 1985) has been the creation of a single market that 
would contribute to the liberalization of world trade, offering new opportunities for trading 
partners of the Community. Increased competition on the Community market, which 
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prevents the removal of internal barriers, would have an impact on companies from countries 
outside the Community. The decisions were made concrete in the form of the Single 
European Act (SEA), and the Program for the completion of the internal market in the EU 
became known as the Program in 1992. Adopting the White Paper on the Single Market 
planned the removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers in order to achieve the EC 
single market. The SEA came into force in July, 1987 when the amendments to the Treaty 
of Rome were introduced, and were related to the reduction of the number of questions that 
were asked for unanimous decision-making. As a consequence, it was not possible to 
dispose certain proposals for years because one or two Member States objected to them. 
The Program was initiated in 1992 because of the belief that it would lead to significant 
economic benefits for the countries and peoples of the Community. In an attempt to 
quantify these benefits, the Commission apointed Paolo Cecchini to chair the Committee of 
Experts. His report, published in 1988, was based on research and Industrials 11,000 
econometric model provided a more realistic prediction of functioning of the single market. 
In fact, the introduction of the single market is expected to remove barriers to reduce 
production costs, and on that basis, lead to a fall in prices, which would only accelerate 
wider competition. Lowering the price to stimulate demand, and thus, indirectly, offer or 
production. Its increase is expected to result in further cost reductions due to increased scale 
of production. The Cecchini report predicted that profit from the removal of trade barriers 
would be 0.2-0.3% of the GDP of the Community, that the profit arising from the removal 
of barriers to production (firms entering foreign markets) would be 2.0-2.4% of GDP and 
that the effects of the increase resulting from economies of scale would amount to 2.1-3.7% 
of GDP, which meant that the total expected profit amounted to 4.3-6.4%. 
Table 1 shows the expected results of operation of the single market on some of the 
main macroeconomic indicators in the EU. It is obvious that the largest gains were 
expected from the liberalization of financial services and the effects on the supply side. 
Most of these effects came as responses from the business sector to more competition, 
ranging from the use of more efficient techniques to economies of scale. 
Table 1. Examined medium-term macroeconomic consequences  




















Change in GDP (%) 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.1 4.5 3.2  5.7 
Change in 
consumer prices 
-1.0 -1.4 -1.4 -2.3 -6.1 -4.5  -7.7 
Change in 
employment (000) 
200 350 400 850 1,800 1,3002,300 
The change in the 
budget balance  
(% of GDP) 
0.2 0.3 1.1 0.6 2.2 1.5  3.0 
The change in the 
balance of payments 
(% of GDP) 
0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.7  1.3 
Cecchini, P. (1988), The European Challenge: 1992, Bruxelles: European Commission. 
I. B. MARKOVIĆ 92 
It is evident, too, that the macroeconomic effects of EU integration were pretty good, 
starting with the GDP growth of 4.5%, decrease in the price level of about 6%, and the 
creation of an additional 2 million new jobs. Of course, the market integration needs to be 
completed, requiring several years to make these numbers become a reality. The  
Cecchini report suggested that greater profit can be realized based on the balance in the 
budget and balance of payments of the member countries. Improving the balance of the 
budgets of the member states to only 0.7% of Community GDP, would increase GDP by 
about 7%, with about 5 million new jobs, without increasing inflation. It was considered 
that positive economic developments in the EU had a positive impact on global economic 
trends, as they acted in the direction of encouraging competition, lower inflation, stimulating 
demand and supply. 
The analysis of the data in Table 1 provides answers to a limited number of questions. 
The report provides insight only into the benefits that followed the unification of markets 
without indulging in the cost analysis, on the other hand. For this reason, it was necessary 
to supplement the cost-benefit analysis of forecasted costs of the single market. However, 
follow-up costs were very difficult, both because of the comparability of the same, and 
the changes in the competence of the Community. The percentage of expenditure in 
relation to the total income of the EU has, of course, grown with the increasing 
competence of the Community/Union. In 1970 it amounted to 0.74% of the total income 
of the EU member states, in 1980 it was 0.80%, in 1990 it was 0.96%, and in 1995 it 
reached 24.1%. Out of the total EU expenditure, the expenditure on agriculture accounted 
for nearly half (49.3%), the Structural Funds 30.5%, the administration of the Union 
4.8%, the external activities of the Union 6.3%, research 3.6%, internal politics 2.1%, 
Development Fund 2.9% and ECCS 0.5%. The EU expenditure normally represents 
about 2.5% of total government spending of the EU member states. Comparing the prices 
of public goods by the Community/Union offers and expenditures shows that the 
integration brings profit. It was also higher due to the fact that the expenditure on agriculture 
and structural adjustment virtually seized the cost of the Community/Union, as they 
returned the economies of the member states. 
Reliance on the mechanism of economies of scale often leads to a merger in larger 
firms (mergers and acquisitions), and the high competitiveness must be maintained 
through imports and foreign direct investment. It is one of the reasons why seeking to 
enter the EU market is relatively easy. If it were not so, then the industry and other 
activities would rapidly internalize and exhaust the effects of economies of scale and 
develop the so-called X - Inefficiency. X - Inefficiency refers to a situation in which the 
total costs of the company are not reduced, although production is not a result of the 
maximum relative to the deployed resources. Thus, if a common market is not open, 
competition and efficiency would decline, and that would cause the anticipated benefits 
never to occur. It just says what the importance of a liberal approach to solving economic 
and political problems was. 
Although the EEC and later the EU itself contained both liberal and regulatory 
elements in the development of its institutions, for decades, it seemed that the regulatory 
approaches have the advantage. Integration has mainly been followed in attempts to 
accomplish through legislation a greater degree of harmonization of conditions and the 
homogenization of the economy, which was wrong. Harmonization took place through 
harmonization of laws and other regulations, through imposing similar or the same 
standards, and even through attempts to standardize prices. It was a tragic mistake, and 
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luckily made just in case of the standardization of agricultural products. Over time, the 
more liberal approach has taken precedence. The reasons for the change are likely to be 
numerous, and they are both internal and external. Researchers and decision-making 
bodies in the EU noted that it was not easy to reach a consensus, even on such seemingly 
trivial matters, such as what is ice cream, and what is yogurt. For these reasons, the EU 
institutions, increasingly began to rely on connections based on differences, i.e. the 
competitive regulation. This practically means that the EU body is increasingly limited in 
defining the rules of the game, and that is therefore left to the actors to decide on how to 
utilize this space. Generally speaking, today, liberal policies are not routing their liberal 
rivals, but they have taken the initiative and signatures. Persistence in this regard was not 
only important for the concept, but also for the success or failure of the entire EU. A clear 
indication that the EU continues to present a strong regulatory power was the strong 
pressure for homogenization of labor legislation. 
There was a lot of debate about the Cecchini report later. Skeptics have pointed out 
that the removal of a large number of small barriers to trade, when the effects of the 
economy are already used, has a negligible impact on the volume of trade, so that the 
overall positive effects were smaller than the report predicted. Critics of other species 
have complained that the report did not take into account the dynamic effects (which is 
true, because it referred to one-time effects) and therefore underestimated the overall 
positive effects by three to four times. This assessment is excessive, as it were, and some 
are skeptical about the assessment of the overall effects of integration. At that time, non-
tariff barriers amounted to about 17% of the total cost, it is suggested that there may be 
significant effects on the basis of economies of scale. In addition, a lot of service sectors 
such as finance, communications and information before the creation of the single market 
were very well protected from competitors. Hence, the fall in price will very likely have 
significant effects on the supply side. However, it is interesting that none of these critics 
disputed the fact that positive effects  exist. After all, the debate about the effects of the 
EU has continued after its formation. 
In October 1996, the Commission prepared a progress report, which showed that 
during the first three and a half years, GDP grew between 1.1% and 1.5%, the investment 
was 2.7% higher and that created 900,000 new jobs. Inflation is also significantly 
reduced, but there were a few„black holes”, mainly because some member states did not 
adequately implement the Single Market Act (this was particularly the case with regard to 
public supply). The inability to agree on a common system of VAT collection meant that 
manufacturers still have to face the enormous paperwork, and that there was no progress 
in the harmonization of taxes certainly seemed restrictive on trade flows. In March 1997, 
Mario Monti, the former EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, demanded vigorous 
action to create a single market until the scheduled start of Monetary Union on 1 January 
1999. Although the goals were not fully achieved, there was a significant progress in the 
field of taxation, intellectual property and prevention of piracy and counterfeiting, as well 
as in the field of financial services by adopting a general framework of legislative 
measures. At the summit in Lisbon in 2000 and Stockholm in 2001 when they were 
supposed to solve issues of financial barriers, create conditions for a more efficient labor 
market and, finally transform the EU into the most competitive region in the world, these 
problems were only partially remedied. Generally speaking, the single market, today, 
essentially, has a few gaps which a resolution is expected to mend in the near future. 
The Cecchini Report with the mentioned disadvantages is a good starting point for the 
design model to measure the effects of EU accession. Arguments in favor of such an 
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assertion lie in the gradual research model. The assessment of the effects of accession 
should start by reviewing business activities, analysis of trade barriers and sectoral 
studies. The second step would be carried out through the analysis of the model of supply 
and demand, with a focus on the collection of direct and indirect effects - multiplier. The 
third, but not least is the analysis of the effects of economies of scale, after which would 
follow the study’s overall competitiveness of the economy. The basic criticism of the 
Cecchini report (a static assessment of the economic effects and too optimistic estimates 
of the positive effects of integration) is largely corrected by the emergence of new models 
for the evaluation of the integration process. 
3. MODELS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES AFTER THE CECCHINI REPORT 
In order to remedy the lack of the basic Cecchini report (a too static assessment of the 
economic effects of integration), in 1989, Baldwin transformed the Cecchini report into a 
dynamic model with short-term and long-term effects of integration. The analysis showed 
that the medium-and long-term gains from the integration were almost twice higher than 
in the Cecchini report, where the effects were evaluated between 2.5% and 6.5% growth 
in GDP assuming the Single European Act in 1992. Haaland and Norman (1992), on the 
other hand, presented a simultaneous study in which the core of the research were the 
economic effects of alternative scenarios, starting from regional enlargement of the 
European Union and EFTA countries without this increase. The conclusion was that there 
are positive effects for all participating countries of the enlargement process, and for the 
members of the EC and EFTA. In another paper, Haaland and Norman (1995) calculated 
the effects of the reallocation of resources (inflows and outflows of capital), with the 
conclusion that the EFTA countries would benefit from the goods and services sector, 
and encounter a loss in the capital movements sector. 
Using a general equilibrium model, Keuschningg and Kohler did extensive research 
from 1994 to 1996 when they calculated the effects of the integration on the budget (for 
Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway). The profit for the new member states in terms of 
GDP ranged from 0.5 to 1.4% of GDP. In their next survey (1999), the same authors 
investigated in more detail the effects of integration on Austria, starting with the theory 
of various scenarios of economic policy and the results of quantitative simulations. In 
addition to specifying the theoretical and empirical research in the field of cost-benefit 
analysis, they developed a simultaneous macro econometric model. It involved modeling 
certain parameters - aggregate supply and aggregate demand, labor market, the household 
sector, investment, government and foreign trade. The main conclusion was that EU 
accession would have a positive global impact on GDP growth (about 1%), welfare, 
foreign trade, competitiveness, available capital, employment and the fall in prices, but 
also some negative effects on certain sectors. 
The first studies that are directly related to the assessment of the effects of EU 
enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe, are often associated with the names of 
Hamilton,Winters, Baldwin, Breuss and Schebeck. Using the so-called Gravity model, 
Hamilton and Winters (1992) were able to calculate in various works the long-term 
potential of trade between geographically close countries. The basic idea of the model 
was that the volume of foreign trade between the two countries is directly correlated to 
their size and distance. In practical terms, it is important to intensify cooperation with the 
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countries geographically close to the EU countries (such as Austria, Germany, and Italy) 
and, to a large extent, increase the volume of foreign trade, even by four times. Brown 
(1997) using a kind of general equilibrium models (Michigan Model of World Production 
and Trade) calculated the effects of EU enlargement for three new member countries: 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. According to Brown, the gain for the new 
member states ranged from 3.8% to 7.3% of GDP, while for the EU itself the extended 
benefit from these countries was entirely symbolic - from 0.1% to 0.2%. 
The co-author work by Francois, Portres and Baldwin (1997) developed the first 
detailed scenario of the effects of enlargement of the EU, both for Member States and 
candidate countries. Interestingly, they used a simultaneous macroeconomic general 
equilibrium model which did not take into account the cost of adapting the new members 
and the adoption of the acquis. A very reserved attitude towards these cost categories 
was, according to the authors, a consequence of the inability of their real quantification. 
Also, in the development of two parallel scenarios - conservative (pessimistic) and the 
less conservative (moderate) - were used both the assumptions to reduce the cost of 
foreign trade on the basis of integration (from 5% to 15%) and reduction of the risk 
premium (from 0% to 15%). The study included a total of ten candidate countries for full 
membership (with the exception of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey), and the following types 
of effects: the effects of trade liberalization, the effects of reducing the risk premium and 
budget effects. The gains for the new members were estimated to be 1.5% to 1.8% of 
GDP, while for the „old” member states about 0.2% of GDP. 
In the framework of this model especially analyzed were the effects of the 
participation of five countries called Visegrad group (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) in the EU funds after switching to full membership. On 
the basis of the current data, it was estimated that the average GDP growth in these 
countries would be 5%, the gain from the Cohesion Fund should be around 26 billion 
euro, from the Structural Funds around 12.8 billion euro, from CAP 5-30 billion euro. 
Total net gains for the new member states, with the deduction of about 23 bn euro under 
the mandatory annual allocation of 1% of GDP in Member States to the EU budget, 
according to these estimates would amount to about 50 billion euro! It is obvious that 
these data are overly optimistic, perhaps even unrealistic. For these reasons, the true 
picture of net profit based on the integration can be obtained only by adjusting the 
(exclusive) costs of adaptation and implementation of the acquis. 
A series of empirical studies were carried out by Schebeck and Breuss (1999) who 
used a similar simultaneous macroeconomic model. The focus of their interest was to 
quantify the effects of EU enlargement for the period to 2010 primarily for the Austrian 
economy, but also for the candidates. The main conclusions of their study are: 
 The costs of EU enlargement would move about 80 billion Euros, of which 12 
billion for the CAP, 40 billion for structural policies (which are also used for the 
candidates), 6 billion for administrative costs and another 22 billion Euros for the 
other five candidate countries (groups of Helsinki). This amount is about 4% of 
GDP in the first five candidate countries and about 0.2% of the GDP of the 
European Union; 
 GDP growth in Austria to 2010 was 1.3% higher than in the case of no extension 
after 2004. It was expected that 27,000 new jobs would open, price would fall by 
1%, the reduction of the budget deficit to 0.4% and increase in current account 
surplus of 1.6% of GDP; 
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 Analyzed and direct trade effects, the impact on FDI, as well as the overall macro-
economic parameters (GDP, current account balance, budget, unemployment, 
consumption). 
One of the most comprehensive studies of the economic effects of the EU enlargement 
up to June, 2001 is entitled The Economic Impact of Enlargement. It was presented to mark 
the ten-year development of the 10 countries in transition (the candidates for full 
membership at that time), with special emphasis on the macroeconomic effects, effects on 
labor migration and effects on agriculture. 
The mentioned model in this research was used later by some researchers to assess the 
clustering effects of EU enlargement as well. The goal to be achieved was to define a 
possible way - a form of behavior of costs and benefits over a period of enlargement and 
immediately afterwards so that these effects follow a qualitative way. It was observed 
that when the effects of a candidate are almost always positive, they are accelerated in the 
aftermath of the full membership, and there is a slower rate in the period before accession 
and after reaching EU standards. In the second group of countries (EU), the benefits were 
greater than the cost of the pre-accession phase, and after reaching the EU standards 
(when costs are significantly declined), while expenses grew very shortly after the 
enlargement. So, for all candidates who see their future as full members of the EU, it is 
essential to have the knowledge of the effects that membership brings to a country. In 
order to facilitate their identification, a general classification was made to direct - that can 
be directly calculated and imply a precise quantitative determination, and indirect - that 
are primarily related to sectoral effects, the effects of resource allocation and redistributive 
effects of income and wealth. Therefore, the main direct effects would be: 
1. The effect of trade creation, which involves changes in domestic demand due to 
the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and lowering import prices (Trade 
costs reduction) in the country that is approaching integration, which intensify 
trade between the member countries of integration; 
2. The Trade diversion effect means slowing foreign trade flows to countries outside 
the European integration, or changing direction of foreign trade to countries within 
the integration at the expense of countries outside the European integration; 
3. The effect on the balance of payments which is directly dependent on the previous 
two effects, because they mostly affect the improvement or deterioration of the 
balance of payments; 
4. The budget effect (Government Revenue effect) implies a change in budget 
revenues due to the reduction or elimination of customs duties and other barriers, 
leading to lower revenue per unit value of imports, but to higher total revenues 
from growth in the volume of trade, expansion and revenue base. This effect is 
often also called the transfer because it includes all funds (Structural and 
Cohesion) and resources (based on CAP and pre-accession assistance) that go to 
the candidate countries from the EU budget. The aforementioned transfers 
significantly affect the growth of investment, employment, income, and finally, 
GDP of the new member states; 
5. The effect of the growth of the welfare and living standards of consumers 
(Welfare effect) is achievable due to lower import prices and limit monopoly 
pricing strategy and market segmentation. 
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On the other hand, the indirect effects of integration are: 
1. Sectoral effects, which include the impact on production, employment and trade 
volumes by sectors; 
2. Effects on resource allocation and redistribution of income; 
3. Effects of the terms of trade are determined by changing the purchasing power of 
the country's exports, which is approaching integration, due to changes in export 
and import prices of products; 
4. Effects on improving the international competitive position of a country becoming 
a full member of the European Union are defined on the basis of more privileged 
to cheaper factors of production and, therefore, more competitive (with lower 
costs and prices) production; 
5. Effects of commercial rents, which arise due to differences between higher domestic 
and lower import prices; 
6. Negative effects caused by adjustment costs, on the basis of: 
 Shaping the institution in accordance with EU requirements, 
 Application of rules deriving from the acquis, the most important being those 
in the field of standardization, agriculture, transport, energy, environment, 
 Falling production and rising unemployment (in the first years of membership), 
and the creation of so-called negative effect due to the manufacturing of opening 
up to foreign competion, and 
 Adequate social programs for workers who lose their jobs. 
7. Indirect political benefits in the form of: 
 Use geo-strategic advantages due to EU membership, 
 Support of stability, democracy and the rule of law, 
 The increase in international security, and 
 Growth of FDI and GDP due to the reduction of political risk (The Risk 
Premium Effect).  
CONCLUSION 
Enlargement is one of the most powerful tools of EU policy. The attractiveness of the 
EU has helped to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into modern, 
well-functioning democracies. It has inspired far-reaching reforms in the candidate 
countries and potential candidates. All European citizens benefit from having neighbors 
that are stable democracies and prosperous market economies. Enlargement is a process 
that is carefully managed and that helps the transformation of the countries involved, 
extending peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law across 
Europe. Euro optimists are happy to point out the above mentioned facts when they want 
to show the benefits of joining the EU. And benefits alone. The costs are somewhat 
hidden behind the view that the country's accession to the EU has virtually no alternative. 
For this reason, almost all the countries that joined the EU as a major foreign policy 
priority emphasized membership in the EU. Models to provide the most realistic picture 
of the benefits and costs of membership in the EU are reluctantly used for the purpose of 
economic analysis. 
If we were to give a general assessment of the effects of integration and success of 
their quantification, it could be said that the possession of appropriate macroeconomic 
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model and relatively usable statistics conditio sine qua non of successful analysis. The 
EU15 is, for example, all the time, preparation and application of expansion strongly 
dominated by the view that it is used in light of cost and is useful for the expansion of the 
EU15. Authors who have to prove it generally use very complex models, which may not 
be reliable (because the reality is unpredictable and complex). That is possibly a useful 
extension for EU15, but it does not mean that it is harmful for 10 or 13 new countries. 
The models are, according to some authors, often a mere „smoke screen” that allows you 
to prove what you want. The actual effects of the expansion can be anticipated, but their 
accurate quantification is hardly possible. It is not surprising, because in the process such 
complicated calculations are too complex to be accurately performed. In order to develop 
high quality studies of comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of accession, of 
great benefit may be the experience of the newcomer countries in terms of costs incurred 
and estimated earnings. Only in this way would it be possible to apply the appropriate 
mathematical and econometric technologies that successfully presented the real economic 
assessment of the effects of European integration. 
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EFEKTI PROŠIRENJA EU U EMPIRIJSKIM MODELIMA 
Literatura posvećena EU često ističe njenu hibridnu stranu koja se nalazi u procesu stalne 
transformacije. Proces je sveobuhvatan, u ekonomskom, političkom i vojno-bezbedonosnom domenu. 
Ovaj kompleksan zadatak nije vremenski ograničen jer je shvaćen kao proces, a ne jednokratni čin. Nije 
napuštena prvobitna ideja da se društvene promene evolutivno razvijaju i da traže vreme za prelazak u 
kvalitet. Iako je današnje okruženje EU veoma promenjeno u odnosu na ono iz kasnih pedesetih godina 
prošlog veka, osnovni razlozi da bi neka zemlja pristupila Uniji su ostali praktično isti. Svi oni u svojoj 
osnovi imaju iste težnje potencijalnih zemalja kandidata za članstvo: političke, ekonomske, kulturne, 
bezbedonosne i dr. Posedovanje odgovarajućeg makroekonomskog modela i relativno upotrebljivih 
statističkih podataka predstavlja conditio sine qua non uspešne analize odnosa koristi i troškova 
pristupanja EU.  
Ključne reči: proces pristupanja, EU, efekti pristupanja, Čekini izveštaj, empirijski modeli 
pristupanja. 
